26 mai 2015
26 Mai 2015

Research Seminar, Pr Mark Roe, Harvard Law School : “Three Systems of Bankruptcy -Or Is It Four?”

Research Seminar

Professor Mark J. Roe,  Harvard Law School

 Will present the paper:  “Three Systems of Bankruptcy -Or Is It Four?”

26th May 2015 at 12:00

Room: To be confirmed

ESCP EUROPE

79 avenue de la République 75011 Paris

Abstract: Absent bankruptcy law, creditors would race to the courthouse, as the bankruptcy cliché has it, to sue, to obtain a judgment, and then to levy on the debtor’s property. Such a race would destroy the firm’s remaining organizational value in modern, complex firms, forcing it to close down even if not economically warranted. It would do so to the detriment of the firms’ slower moving creditors, the firms’ owners, and surely their employees, customers, and place in the economy. But in a modern bankruptcy we instead hold the firm together, decide whether it is worth continuing, and, if it is, restructure its ownership. Creditors become shareholders and shareholders take a diminished position or are wiped out. Read more

26 mai 2015
26 Mai 2015

Research Seminar, Pr Mark Roe, Harvard Law School : “Three Systems of Bankruptcy -Or Is It Four?”

Research Seminar

Professor Mark J. Roe,  Harvard Law School

 Will present the paper:  “Three Systems of Bankruptcy -Or Is It Four?”

26th May 2015 at 12:00

Room: To be confirmed

ESCP EUROPE

79 avenue de la République 75011 Paris

Abstract: Absent bankruptcy law, creditors would race to the courthouse, as the bankruptcy cliché has it, to sue, to obtain a judgment, and then to levy on the debtor’s property. Such a race would destroy the firm’s remaining organizational value in modern, complex firms, forcing it to close down even if not economically warranted. It would do so to the detriment of the firms’ slower moving creditors, the firms’ owners, and surely their employees, customers, and place in the economy. But in a modern bankruptcy we instead hold the firm together, decide whether it is worth continuing, and, if it is, restructure its ownership. Creditors become shareholders and shareholders take a diminished position or are wiped out. Read more

19 mai 2015
19 Mai 2015

Labex ReFi Conference on Accounting Regulation

Labex ReFi Conference on Accounting Regulation
 will take place
on 22nd of May , 2015
in ESCP Europe room Raymond Martin

PROGRAM

10h00 – 11h20 Accounting Regulation: Global or Local?
Speech by Karthik Ramanna (Harvard University) on the Politics of Accounting Regulation, followed by an open discussion with participants
  • Reference paper: Ramanna, Karthik (2015), “Thin Political Markets: The Soft Underbelly of Capitalism.”
  • California Management Review, 57, no. 2 (Winter 2015). forthcoming

11h20 – 11h30 Coffee break

11h30 – 13h00: Accounting loopholes

Speech by Shyam Sunder (Yale University) on Financial Engineering and the arms race between accounting standard setters and preparers, followed by an open discussion with participants

Reference paper: Dye, Ronald A. and Glover, Jonathan C. and Sunder, Shyam, Financial Engineering and the Arms Race between Accounting Standard Setters and Preparers (September 12, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2508360

13h – 14h30 Lunch for invited participants and keynote speakers

Additional readings

Ramanna, Karthik (2013), The International Politics of IFRS Harmonization. Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium, 3 (2) (April 2013): 146. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ael20130004

Sunder, Shyam (2011), Imagined Worlds of Accounting, Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium, 1 (1) (January 2011).DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/21522820.1014

Organisers: Yuri Biondi (Cnrs – ESCP Europe, Labex ReFi) and Christophe Moussu (ESCP Europe, Labex ReFi)

19 mai 2015
19 Mai 2015

Labex ReFi Conference on Accounting Regulation

Labex ReFi Conference on Accounting Regulation
 will take place
on 22nd of May , 2015
in ESCP Europe room Raymond Martin

PROGRAM

10h00 – 11h20 Accounting Regulation: Global or Local?
Speech by Karthik Ramanna (Harvard University) on the Politics of Accounting Regulation, followed by an open discussion with participants
  • Reference paper: Ramanna, Karthik (2015), “Thin Political Markets: The Soft Underbelly of Capitalism.”
  • California Management Review, 57, no. 2 (Winter 2015). forthcoming

11h20 – 11h30 Coffee break

11h30 – 13h00: Accounting loopholes

Speech by Shyam Sunder (Yale University) on Financial Engineering and the arms race between accounting standard setters and preparers, followed by an open discussion with participants

Reference paper: Dye, Ronald A. and Glover, Jonathan C. and Sunder, Shyam, Financial Engineering and the Arms Race between Accounting Standard Setters and Preparers (September 12, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2508360

13h – 14h30 Lunch for invited participants and keynote speakers

Additional readings

Ramanna, Karthik (2013), The International Politics of IFRS Harmonization. Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium, 3 (2) (April 2013): 146. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ael20130004

Sunder, Shyam (2011), Imagined Worlds of Accounting, Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium, 1 (1) (January 2011).DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/21522820.1014

Organisers: Yuri Biondi (Cnrs – ESCP Europe, Labex ReFi) and Christophe Moussu (ESCP Europe, Labex ReFi)

11 mai 2015
11 Mai 2015

Research Seminar. Pr U Dulleck, QUT Business School, « Imposing Codes of Good Conduct Promotes Social Behaviour »

Research Seminar

11th May 2015 at 12:00

ESCP EUROPE

Professor Uwe Dulleck,  QUT Business School

 Will present the paper:

“Imposing Codes of Good Conduct Promotes Social Behaviour”

 

Abstract: In this article we study experimentally how public statements about future social behaviour, used in oaths and code of conducts, affect individual decisions. While the literature focuses on bilateral interactions, we study a social dilemma situation. We show that in such a context compulsory statements may be more effective than voluntary ones. A large part of human activities rely on the compliance of individuals with certain behavioural standards, especially when material incentives for opportunistic behaviour are prevalent. Good academic conduct or ethical behaviour in positions of political or economic power are examples. Oaths or Codes of conduct have been proposed as an instrument to fight this social dilemma. In this article we test the effect of such statement of intent and distinguish between voluntary and compulsory statements. Three effects are prevalent: a selection effect, i.e. people with a general high propensity to contribute make a statement; a commitment effect, i.e. people making the statement increase their contribution; and a coordination effect, i.e. people increase their contributions due to the assurance that the other players also pledged the statement.

The comparison of voluntary and compulsory statements shows, that the effect is strongest when the statement is imposed on everyone, emphasizing the role the coordination effect plays in social dilemma situations.

 

 

Organizers: Prof. Gunther Capelle-Blancard (Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Labex Refi), Prof. Christophe Moussu (ESCP Europe, Labex Refi), Arthur Petit-Romec (ESCP Europe, Labex Refi)

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