Calendar

Déc
15
ven
Research Seminar, ReFi – Ryan Williams – University of Arizona – CEO Mobility, Performance-Turnover Sensitivity, and Compensation: Evidence from Non-Compete Contracts.
Déc 15 @ 12 h 00 min – 13 h 30 min

 

 

Organized by Prof. Gunther Capelle-Blancard (Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Labex ReFi) and Prof. Christophe Moussu (ESCP Europe, Labex ReFi).

Ryan Williams

University of Arizona

(cv & bio)

CEO Mobility, Performance-Turnover Sensitivity, and Compensation: Evidence from Non-Compete Contracts.

(Paper here)

Meeting Ryan Williams

Dear all,
We are having Ryan Williams (University of Arizona) next Friday in our ReFi research seminar series (see here for more information).
Ryan will be available to meet with the faculty and PhD students during the afternon. If you are interested in meeting him, please send an email to Thomas David (tdavid@escpeurope.eu) indicating which of the following time slots suits you best:
14.30-15.00, 15.00-15.30, 15.30-16.00, 16.00-16.30, 16.30-17.00, 17.00-17.30

Abstract 

Non-compete agreements limit the mobility of employees, thereby imposing significant costs by reducing their outside options.  In this paper, we focus on CEO non-compete agreements largely because CEOs have a better ability to negotiate their employment contracts than rank-and-file employees and their joining a competitor is likely to cause the greatest economic damage to the firm. Specifically, using hand collected data on CEO non-compete agreements, we examine: (i) the determinants of CEO non-compete agreements, (ii) the impact of CEO non-compete agreements on the CEO performance-turnover sensitivity, and (iii) how CEO non-compete agreements affect the level and structure of CEO compensation. We find evidence that is consistent with the argument that the presence of a non-compete agreement is the outcome of a bargaining game between the CEO and the firm. Consistent with the idea that non-compete agreements lower the likelihood that a departing CEO can create economic harm to the firm by joining a competitor, we find that the CEO performance-turnover sensitivity is significantly stronger when the CEO has a non-compete agreement in place. Finally, we find that CEO total compensation is higher if CEOs have non-compete contracts, but that the firm pays such compensation as incentive-based pay, consistent with the ex-post realization of the ex-ante bargaining game. We exploit staggered state-level changes in non-compete enforceability to establish causality. Our paper illustrates the impact of restrictions of CEO mobility on how CEOs are monitored and compensated by the firm.

 

ESCP EUROPE
79 avenue de la République 75011 Paris
Friday  15 December 2017
12:00am  to  13:30pm, Room 4310
For security reason, please register before the deadline.
Deadline: 14 December 2017
NB. If you are prevented from coming, we would be obliged if you could inform us as soon as possible at contact@labex-refi.com.
Jan
12
ven
Research Seminar, ReFi – Gino Loyola Fuentes – Universidad de Chile – Optimal financing of highly innovative projects under double moral hazard
Jan 12 @ 12 h 00 min – 13 h 30 min

 

 

Organized by Prof. Gunther Capelle-Blancard (Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Labex ReFi) and Prof. Christophe Moussu (ESCP Europe, Labex ReFi).

Gino Loyola Fuentes

 

Universidad de Chile

(cv & bio)

Optimal financing of highly innovative projects under double moral hazard

Abstract 

tba

 

(Paper tba)

ESCP EUROPE
79 avenue de la République 75011 Paris
Friday  12 January 2017
12:00am  to  13:30pm, Room 4310
For security reason, please register before the deadline.
Deadline: 10 January 2017
Registration : tba
NB. If you are prevented from coming, we would be obliged if you could inform us as soon as possible at contact@labex-refi.com.
Jan
16
mar
Research Seminar, ReFi – Jeffry Frieden – Harvard – Currency Politics: The political economy of exchange rate policy
Jan 16 @ 12 h 00 min – 13 h 30 min

 

 

Organized by Prof. Gunther Capelle-Blancard (Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Labex ReFi) and Prof. Christophe Moussu (ESCP Europe, Labex ReFi).

Jeffry Frieden

Harvard University

(cv & bio)

Currency Politics : The political economy of exchange rate policy

Abstract 

tba

(Paper tba)

ESCP EUROPE
79 avenue de la République 75011 Paris
thuesday 16 January 2017
12:00am  to  13:30pm, Room 4110
For security reason, please register before the deadline.
Deadline: 14 January 2017
Registration : tba
NB. If you are prevented from coming, we would be obliged if you could inform us as soon as possible at contact@labex-refi.com.
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