The Laboratory of Excellence for Financial Regulation (LabEx-ReFi) has been created as an initiative of CNAM, ENA, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (CES, PRISM and IRJS) and ESCP Europe (the project leader) in the context of the « Grand Emprunt ». The LabEx-ReFi is a research centre dedicated to the evaluation of regulation policies, with its main objectives being to improve the understanding of financial systems and regulations’ implications, with a view of providing public authorities with independent academic expertise and guidelines for actions. Learn more here


[Registration deadline] Second French Workshop on Corporate Governance
Mai 31 – Juin 1 Journée entière


Second French Workshop on Corporate Governance

June 12/13

ESCP Europe, Paris Campus

Program (PDF)

First day: 12/06/2017

13:30-14:00 :   Welcome & Coffee 

Chair : Christophe Moussu, Labex & ESCP

14:00-14:40 :  « CEO Compensation and Real Estate Prices »

  • Ben Bennett (Ohio State)
  • Claudia Custodio (Imperial)
  • Dragana Cvijanović (UNC at Chapel Hill)

Discussant: Federica Salvade (Labex & ESCP Europe)

14:40-15:20 :  « Common Institutional Ownership and Diffusion of Innovation« 

  • Alberto Manconi (Bocconi), Leonard Kostovetsky (Boston College)

Discussant: Daniel Ferreira (LSE)

15:20-16:00 :  « Free-riders and Underdogs: Participation in Corporate Voting »

  • Dragana Cvijanović (UNC at Chapel Hill)
  • Moqi Xu (LSE)
  • Konstantinos E. Zachariadis (Queen Mary University of London)

Discussant: Clemens Otto (HEC)

16:00-16:30   Coffee Break

Chair : Gunther Capelle Blancard, Labex & Paris 1

16:30-17:10 :  « Ownership Concentration and Firm Risk. Evidence from the US« 

  • Silvia Rossetto (TSE),
  • Raffaele Stagliano (Montpellier Business School)

Discussant: Francois Belot (Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

17:10-17:50 « Takeover Duration and Negotiation Process: A Structural Approach »

  • Riccardo Calcagno (EmLyon)
  •  Eric de Bodt (Université de Lille)
  •  Irina Demidova (Université du Quebec a Montreal)

Discussant: Gilles Chemla (Imperial & Dauphine)

second day: 13/06/2017

8:30-9:00    Coffee

Chair : Michael Troege (Labex & ESCP)

9:00-9:40 :  « Institutional Ownership and Bank Capital Structure« 

  •  Alexandre Garel (Aukland Institute of Technology)
  •  Arthur-Petit Romec (Labex & ESCP Europe)

Discussant: Maria Teresa Marchica (Manchester Business School)

9:40-10:20 : « Strategic Managerial Adaptation to Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Use of Embedded Antitakeover Defenses »

  • Loic Belze (EmLyon)
  • Geraldine Hottegindre (EmLyon),
  • Mahbub Zaman (QUT)

Discussant: Mieszko Mazur (IESEG)

10:20-10:50   Coffee Break

Chair : Pramuan Bunkanwanicha (Labex & ESCP)

10:50 -11:30 : « Internalizing Governance Externalities: The Role of Institutional Cross-ownership »

  • Jie (Jack) He (U. of Georgia, Terry College of Business)
  • Jiekun Huang (UI at Urbana-Champaign)
  • Shan Zhao (Grenoble Business School)

Discussant: Edith Ginglinger (Dauphine)

11h30-12h10 : « Facilitating takeovers and takeover premia: The case of coordinated monitoring »

  • Ettore Croci (Universita’ Cattolica)
  • Mieszko Mazur (IESEG)
  • Galla Salganik-Shoshan (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)

Discussant: Thomas David  (Dauphine)

*presenters are marked in bold

Due to limited access, please register before the 31st of May if you want to attend


For more information please contact :

Les workshop du Labex ReFi (ici)

Juin 1 @ 8 h 30 min – 10 h 00 min

# Logo Labex # SIG_Investissements_Davenir         Logo-EIFR



Financial markets have historically been regulated. This regulation is often motivated by the desire to discourage speculation and to limit negative externalities, where the behaviour of an individual investor or institution can destabilise the financial market as a whole. The recent financial crisis, which has highlighted the negative feedback from financial markets to the real sector, has intensified the debate about the ability of financial-market regulations to stabilise financial markets and improve macroeconomic outcomes.

In this research, we study the intended and unintended consequences of various regulatory measures used to reduce fluctuations in financial as well as real markets and to improve welfare. The measures we study are the ones that have been proposed by regulators in response to the financial crisis: the financial-transactions tax, short-sale constraints, and borrowing constraints. Based on those illustrative cases, the research objective is to minimise the risk of unintended consequences of regulations,

Raman Uppal, 
Professor of Finance at EDHEC Business School

Raman Uppal is Professor of Finance at EDHEC Business School.  He holds a bachelor’s degree in Economics (Honors) from St. Stephen’s College, Delhi University, and a Ph.D. from The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.  He was Professor at London Business School and the University of British Columbia. His research  focuses on optimal portfolio selection and asset allocation in dynamic environments, valuation of securities in capital markets,  risk management, and exchange rates.  He has taught courses on Portfolio Choice and Asset Pricing, International Financial Markets, Multinational Financial Management, Risk Management, and Corporate Finance. He is the recipient of the Dean’s Advisory Board’s Outstanding Teaching Award for 1988 at The Wharton School, the General Excellence Teaching Award for 2002 and the inaugural Excellence in Teaching Award in 2008 at London Business School and the Prize for Pedagogical Excellence at EDHEC Business School in 2015.

Inscription en ligne 

NB. Merci de vous inscrire en tant que membre du Labex ReFi pour bénéficier de l’entrée gratuite.

Dans l’attente de vous rencontrer,

European Institute of Financial Regulation (EIFR)
Palais Brongniart
28 place de la Bourse
75002 PARIS
Tél: +33 (0) 1 70 98 06 53
Research Seminar, ReFi – Corporate short-termism, by Mark Roe, Corporate short-termism
Juin 8 @ 12 h 00 min – 13 h 30 min




Organized by Prof. Gunther Capelle-Blancard (Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Labex ReFi) and Prof. Christophe Moussu (ESCP Europe, Labex ReFi).

Mark Roe

Harvard Law School

(cv & bio)

Corporate short-termism

The presentation will be based on, and extend:

Corporate Short-termism — In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 Business Lawyer 977 (2013)

Consult the paper here

Abstract :

A long-held view in corporate circles has been that furious rapid trading in stock markets has been increasing in recent decades, justifying corporate governance and corporate law measures that would further shield managers and boards from shareholder influence, to further free boards and managers to pursue their view of sensible long-term strategies in their investment and management policies.

Here, I evaluate the evidence in favor of that view and find it insufficient to justify insulating boards from markets further. While there is evidence of short-term stock market distortions, the view is countered by several underanalyzed aspects of the American economy, each of which alone could trump a prescription for more board autonomy. Together they make the case for further judicial isolation of boards from markets untenable. First, even if the financial markets were, net, short-term oriented, one must evaluate the American economy from a system-wide perspective. As long as venture capital markets, private equity markets, and other conduits mitigate, or reverse, much of any short-term tendencies in public markets, then a potential short-term problem is largely local but not systemic. Second, the evidence that the stock market is, net, short-termist is inconclusive, with considerable evidence that stock market sectors often overvalue the long term. Third, managerial mechanisms inside the corporation, including compensation packages with a duration that is shorter than typical institutional stock market holdings, and managerial labor markets across firms, including managerial efforts to get good results on their watch, are important sources of short-term distortions; insulating boards from markets further would exacerbate these managerial short-term-favoring mechanisms. Fourth, courts are not well positioned to make this kind of basic economic policy, which, if determined to be a serious problem, is better addressed with policy tools unavailable to courts. And, fifth, the widely held view that short-term trading has increased dramatically in recent decades over-interpret, the data; the duration for holdings of many of the country’s major stockholders, such as mutual funds run by Fidelity and Vanguard, and major pension funds, does not seem to have shortened. Rather, a high-velocity trading fringe has emerged, and its rise affects average holding periods, but not the holding period for the country’s ongoing major stockholding institutions.

The view that stock market short-termism should affect corporate lawmaking fits snugly with two other widely supported views. One is that managers must be free from tight stockholder influence, because without that freedom boards and managers cannot run the firm well. Whatever the value of this view and however one judges the line between managerial autonomy and managerial accountability to stockholders should be drawn, short-termism provides no further support for managerial insulation from the influence of financial markets. The autonomy argument must stand or fall on its own. Similarly, those who argue that employees, customers, and other stakeholders are due more consideration in corporate governance point to pernicious short-termism to support their view further. But these stakeholder considerations can be long-term and they can be short-term. As such, the best view of the evidence is similarly that the pro-stakeholder view must stand or fall on its own. It gains no further evidence-based, conceptual support from a fear of excessive short-termism in financial markets. Overall, system-wide short-termism in public firms is something to watch for carefully, but not something that today should affect corporate lawmaking.

Keywords: Blockholders, board insulation, bubbles, corporate governance, Delaware, hedge funds, holding duration, investor horizons, long-term value, market efficiency, mergers, myopia, private equity, R&D, short-termism, stakeholder, takeovers, Tobin tax, venture capital

JEL Classification: D21, G3, G18, G28, G30, G34, G38, H73, K4, K20, K22, K42, L21


79 avenue de la République 75011 Paris
Thursday 8 june 2017
12:00am  to  13:30pm, Room tba
For security reason, please register before the deadline.
Deadline: 25 mai 2017
NB. If you are prevented from coming, we would be obliged if you could inform us as soon as possible at



International Conference on Public Authority and Finance

Paris, September 1 and 2, 2017

The Laboratory of Excellence on Financial Regulation is pleased to announce a call for papers for its International Conference on Public Authority and Finance, to be held in Paris on September 1 and 2, 2017. This conference is being organised by: Labex ReFI (Paris). It is partnered by the Centre on Corporate Governance, Columbia Law School (New York), the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, DIW (Berlin), Policy Network (London), and the Université Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris 3 (CERVEPAs, Paris).

Laern more here

34th Symposium on Money, Banking and Finance

Paris Ouest Nanterre La Defense, July 5th & 6th, 2017

This conference is being organised by the GdRE in partenership with Labex ReFi. It is coordinated by Jean-Bernard CHATELAIN (CES, Labex ReFi), Alexis DIRER (GDRE Co-Directors), Christophe BOUCHER, and Michel BOUTILLIER (heads of local committee).

Laern more here

Accounting, Economics and Law’ SASE Research Network Conference
University of Lyon 1 Lyon (France),
29 June – 1 July, 2017

This conference is being organised by the research unit FIAR of Labex ReFi

Laern more here


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